Five years ago, the humanitarian sector was in serious trouble. The world was changing faster than expected and conflicts were turning ever more violent. In this context, how could the sector keep up with assisting people in need from all corners of the world? The answer was clear: more money was needed. The main concern became a growing funding gap. In 2015, this gap amounted to a staggering 45 percent, as the needed USD 19.8 billion was met by donors with USD 10.9 billion. It is then that António Guterres, as head of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), famously declared that the humanitarian system is “broke, but not broken”.
All efforts were refocused on making the humanitarian system more efficient and cost-effective. In preparation for the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS), the High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing looked for ways to close the funding gap. The Panel came up with three solutions: decrease existing humanitarian needs, increase resources dedicated to humanitarian action, or improve the delivery of aid. It is with the latter in mind that the Grand Bargain was born. Launched at the WHS in Istanbul in May 2016, the Grand Bargain was an innovative agreement, bringing together thirty representatives of donor and aid agencies to make funding more efficient and effective. And it aimed high. Within five years it was expected to produce annual savings of USD 1 billion.
The truly original part of the Grand Bargain is reflected in its name. It was a bargain. It was a negotiated arrangement between donors and organizations who implemented projects on the ground, including United Nations organizations, international NGOs, and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. The bargain implied a series of trade-offs until a common ground was reached. This common ground took the shape of a package of 51 commitments divided into 10 workstreams. Transparency, localization, cash-based programming, reduction of overhead costs, simplified reporting requirements, joint needs assessments, multi-year planning and funding, and the humanitarian-development nexus were all part of the package.
The Grand Bargain went beyond previous aid reforms that had targeted specific segments of the humanitarian system. It targeted instead the functioning of the entire system as a whole and everyone in it. At the time, the Gran Bargain seemed to be set up for success. All stakeholders were eager for change and the package of commitments reflected the most pressing issues in need of reform. This time really seemed different. Five years in, momentum has considerably slowed. And today, the humanitarian sector is once again in serious trouble.
After months of consultations among the now 63 signatories, a Grand Bargain 2.0 is on the table. With the aim of enhancing the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of the aid system, signatories convened on 15-17 June 2021 at the annual meeting to decide on a new framework, which would run until 2023. What has the Grand Bargain achieved and what is the way forward towards the Grand Bargain 2.0?
Progress achieved over the past five years varies greatly across the different workstreams. Workstreams with most advances, both at the policy-level and in practice, are those on localization (Workstream 2), cash assistance (Workstream 3), joint needs assessments (Workstream 5), and harmonized reporting (Workstream 9). The picture is not as clear for Workstream 6, ambitiously titled a “participation revolution”. The workstream intended to tackle one of the most fundamental imbalances in the humanitarian system: the take-it-or-leave-it attitude towards people affected by crisis. The “participation revolution” was an attempt to revamp the widespread practice whereby affected populations have little influence over services they receive and do not have access to meaningful feedback mechanisms. The Grand Bargain clearly stated that “it is important to provide accessible information, ensure that an effective process for participation and feedback is in place and that design and management decisions are responsive to the views of affected communities and people”. It drew on two guidelines: the Core Humanitarian Standard and the IASC Commitments to Accountability to Affected Populations.
Despite a promising start in 2016 and 2017 with strong investment from the co-conveners – the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) and the United States – a lack of collective political will from different stakeholders failed to deliver on the expected “revolution”. Some progress has been made in defining the concept “participation”, collecting good practice examples, agreeing on success indicators, creating specific guidance such as that included in the Handbook for Humanitarian Coordinators, and identifying the remaining challenges to effective participation. Additionally, some field-level practices on engaging affected populations have emerged, such as the UNICEF-led Common Services for Community Engagement (CSCE).
Despite these efforts and far from a revolution, five years later there is still no evidence that the humanitarian system has become more demand driven. Findings from perception surveys conducted annually by Ground Truth Solutions (GTS) since 2017 suggest that there is no improvement across indicators on accountability to affected populations. Affected populations do not think that humanitarian aid meets their needs. They remain unable to influence decisions on aid, even though there is extensive evidence on the benefits of including them. This is mainly because much of the progress has focused on information sharing and gathering feedback, as feedback mechanisms are becoming increasingly professionalized, be it in the form of hotlines, complaints boxes, or SMS surveys. The point is that this feedback is collected but does not influence top-down decision-making. Some organizations are starting to incorporate the feedback gathered into programing, but such initiatives fall short of a system-wide “participation revolution”. Similarly, only a small number of donors is starting to integrate requirements on participatory approaches in their funding agreements.
In reality there are strong disincentives pushing against effective participation. Both donors and aid organizations are increasingly risk intolerant. Engaging affected populations can reveal some hard truths about organizations’ programming which in turn may lead to drops in donor funding. Participation is thus perceived as a potential threat when it actually is an opportunity to make the humanitarian system more effective and efficient.
The original Grand Bargain failed to deliver on its promises because its ambitious 51 commitments were not tied to accountability mechanisms. It was a bargain without financial or reputational consequences for non-compliance. The Grand Bargain 2.0 simplified the workstreams and commitments, reducing its focus to two priority areas that have the potential for a system-wide transformation: localization, including the participation of affected communities, and quality funding that is more flexible and long-term. More importantly, the Grand Bargain 2.0 has been elevated to the strategic and political sphere rather than remaining at the technical working level. Annex II lists some opportunities to strengthen the engagement of local actors across different levels. At the political level, there should be a local actor representative as part of the Facilitation Group, while local actors are also encouraged to engage with the Grand Bargain 2.0 at the technical level by providing constructive feedback and ideas on how to address current challenges. Local actors can also become involved as Signatories, primarily through consortia that represent the size and diversity of these stakeholders. At the national level, actors are encouraged to form National or Regional Reference Groups where the Great Bargain 2.0 framework is used to hold all humanitarian actors accountable to delivering to it. These Reference Groups can include affected populations and civil society. All of the proposed opportunities, however, also require dedicated resources and cost-sharing arrangements to support local actors.
Participation of affected populations still requires two important shifts in the system. Humanitarian organizations need to actively utilize the feedback gathered from affected population to adjust their programs. Donors, at the same time, need to allow humanitarian organizations some flexibility to make such adjustments. Can the Grand Bargain 2.0 truly provide enough momentum for these shifts? Only time will tell.
About the Author:
Juliette Dautriat is currently a Junior Officer with Trust’s Research Department. She is pursuing her Master’s in International Humanitarian Action (NOHA) at Uppsala University and the University of Malta, specialising in forced migration and human security.
Sources:
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