The meaning of “corruption” is very wide and as such, defining the concepts of fraud and bribery becomes difficult when the meaning of corruption differs from culture to culture. This is further complicated when something that is perfectly acceptable in one culture, such as nepotism, can be totally unacceptable in another. For example, in many countries with weak financial system and non-meritocratic policies, is very common for children of well-known families to get unfairly high prestigious job, only because they have monetary power or because they take advantage of their relative’s reputation. According to Transparency International’s corruption is “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. In the humanitarian sector, the mechanism of corruption follows specific patterns and displays similar features. However, TPM and M&E companies involved in the monitoring and evaluation work of humanitarian projects have the right to choose whether they will act as a deterrent to corrupt practices or if they will strengthen the cycle of corruption.
How does TPM and M&E strengthen corrupt practices within the humanitarian sphere?
There are many cases where TPM and M&E companies were involved in corrupt practices during the implementation of a project. This results in the failure of the project and increases the beneficiaries’ overall levels of vulnerability. There are many ways corruption can manifest itself during TPM activities, which should be impartial as they are responsible for the unbiased evaluation and monitoring of the project for an INGO/NGO. For instance:
- Members of the TPM team can have direct or indirect relationships with those involved in the project. For this reason, they may hide evidence of corruption or the diversion of aid within the project. For example, in a food distribution project, beneficiaries didn’t receive the amount of food that they were supposed to. In that case, TPM should have reported this misconduct and informed the donor. However, in some instances, distribution reports may be falsified so donors or head offices are not aware of the aid is being abused.
- Evaluators and members of the TPM team may be bribed to overlook corrupt practices and not report the evidence in their reports in order to gain more funds for the project.
- There is a possibility for TPM and M&E companies to acknowledge corruption during the implementation of a project and become involved in it. In this case, the TPM company may be trying to avoid gaining a bad reputation if their company reports the incidences of corruption.
- Members of the TPM team and M&E companies may want to benefit their careers, so they collaborate with the corruption circuit and overlook the illegally distribution of the funds. This type of monitoring and evaluation process can be called “soft observation”.
It is important to mention that the incidence of corruption can happen without the knowledge of the M&E company. Moreover, there is a possibility only some members from both sides of the TPM party and members of the INGO/NGO, to be involved in this type of malpractices.
How TPM and M&E companies fight against the risks of corruption?
There are always two sides to the stories of corruption. In fact, M&E companies and TPM as an evaluation mechanism can also function as one of the most important features in the prevention of corrupt practices in a humanitarian project. More specifically:
- TPM functions as a third “ear and eye” when it comes to the evaluation of a project. For that reason, M&E companies and TPM can identify fraudulent behaviors and prevent corruption in every stage of the intervention.
- TPM can determine if aid is reaching its beneficiaries and assess any possible needs that haven’t been covered, and investigate these gaps.
- TPM works as a disincentive to partaking in corrupt activities. Members of companies or of NGOs that have the intention to commit this kind of actions are being discouraged, when evaluators work independently as observers not associated with internal corruption.
- The members of the TPM party, who conduct the monitoring and evaluation process, differ from the implementation staff of the NGO/INGO. That means that the TPM company doesn’t have relationships with the field workers of the NGO/INGO and cannot be affected by possible corrupted behaviors. For that reason, the evaluation process is more likely to be characterized by transparency and professionalism.
- Internal audits and frequently reports from a TPM can prevent any type of corruption and malpractice as it holds the projects accountable in that it observes if the project fulfill each missions.
In contexts where corrupt practices are likely to occur, M&E and TPM can mitigate the risks of corruption or be part of it. In both ways someone looses and someone wins. However, in recent years INGOs and NGOs hire TPM and M&E companies in order to prevent corrupted behaviors and implement a humanitarian project with transparency and confidentiality.
References
Rahman K. & Duri J. (2020). Best practices for monitoring aid channelled to CSOs and the state during a humanitarian disaster in a pre-existing crisis context. Transparency International Anti-Corruption Helpdesk Answer. Available from: https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/kproducts/Best-practices-on-monitoring-aid-being-channelled-to-CSOs-and-the-State-during-a-humanitarian-disaster-final_PR.pdf
Willitts B. & Harvey K &P (2005). Managing the risks of corruption in humanitarian relief operations. UK Department for International Development. Available from: https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/1977.pdf
Ewins P., Harvey P., Savage K. & Jacobs A. (2006). Mapping the Risks of Corruption in Humanitarian Action. Overseas Development Institute and Management Accounting for NGOs. Available from: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/3C0C5AC1C1DE4F28C12571B800532D74-odi-hpg-corruption-jul2006.pdf
Sagmeister E., Steets J., Derzsi-Horváth A. & Hennion C. (2016). The use of thirdparty monitoring in insecure contexts LESSONS FROM AFGHANISTAN, SOMALIA AND SYRIA. Security Access in Volatile Environments (SAVE). Available from: https://www.gppi.net/media/SAVE__2016__The_use_of_third-party_monitoring_in_insecure_contexts.pdf
Hees R., Debere S. & Schuurman L. (2010.). Preventing Corruption in Humanitarian Operations-Pocket Guide for Good Practices. Transparency International. Available from: https://www.rodekors.no/contentassets/cb5a6498440946c1a3ccd218b04f8be0/pocket-guide_corruption.pdf
About the Author
Kleoniki Mega has recently joined Trust as a Junior Officer in the Learning Unit of Business & Development Department. She is based in Thessaloniki-Greece and she has recently graduated from the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies from University of Macedonia. She is a volunteer in the humanitarian sector for four years now and she has worked with children from Roma and refugee population. Her areas of interest are: forced migration, refugee protection and child protection.
Read more about Kleoniki on LinkedIn.
